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T
he economies of the industrialized countries are being reshaped
by the rapid development and diffusion of advanced information
and communications technologies. Access to information is
unprecedented, and the ability to process and exchange information has
helped businesses increase efficiency and households raise their standards
of living. There has been considerable agreement as to the broad features
of the emerging information economy. But there has been less consensus
on the likely magnitude and significance of the economic effects or on
the important policy issues raised by these developments.
The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City sponsored a symposium,
“Economic Policy for the Information Economy,” at Jackson Hole,
Wyoming, on August 30–September 1, 2001. The symposium brought
together a distinguished group of central bankers, academics, and finan-
cial market experts to examine how the information economy will alter
the structure of economic activity. The symposium also served as a
forum for addressing key policy challenges resulting from the informa-
tion age changing the microeconomic and macroeconomic structure of
the U.S. and foreign economies. Participants agreed that the information
economy has changed the microeconomic and macroeconomic structure
of the U.S. and foreign economies. The general consensus at the sympo-
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I. THE DIMENSIONS OF THE INFORMATION
ECONOMY, MARKET STRUCTURE,
AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
The first day of the symposium covered a variety of topics from var-
ious perspectives, including those of Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan, several current and former policy officials, a financial mar-
ket participant, and several academic economists. The session began
with a discussion of the dimensions of the information economy. After-
ward, the session turned to a discussion of the microeconomic and
financial market effects of the information economy. The day concluded
with an overview of the international digital divide. 
The wealth effect and national saving
In his opening remarks, Chairman Greenspan discussed some issues
related to the wealth effect and the measurement of personal saving.
Greenspan argued that the net wealth-income ratio is not sufficient for
measuring the effect of capital gains on economic activity. He said that
the effect depends on whether the capital gains are realized or not. Real-
ized capital gains are made liquid with the potential to affect spending,
assets, or debt. Unrealized capital gains can also affect spending, assets,
or debt. But, unlike realized gains, unrealized capital gains remain on
the asset side of the household’s balance sheet, exposed to price change
and uncertainty.
Greenspan also said that the effect of capital gains on spending
depends on asset type. Regression analysis suggests that a $1 increase in
overall household wealth leads to an increase of 3 to 5 cents in consumer
spending. In addition, survey evidence suggests that a $1 increase in
realized capital gains on the sale of homes (financed through the mort-
gage market) leads to an increase of 10 to 15 cents in consumer spend-
ing. Therefore, if both estimates are true, then the propensity to spend
out of each dollar of stock market gain must be less than 3 to 5 cents on
the dollar.1 When housing price gains and stock market gains are simi-
lar in size, this difference in marginal propensity to spend may be
insignificant. However, over the last year, stock prices have fallen while
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home prices have risen. Thus, the overall effect may be positive or neg-
ative—depending on the total increase in stock market wealth and
household wealth.
Greenspan went on to discuss the effect of capital gains on the
measurement of personal saving. Since the national income and product
accounts (NIPA) measure the market value of output of goods and ser-
vices and its distribution to the factors of production, they exclude cap-
ital gains and losses. However, for many issues related to consumer
spending, the NIPA personal saving rate “presents an incomplete pic-
ture of the financial state of the household sector in the aggregate.”
Greenspan concluded by saying that separate sets of accounts
should be developed to track capital gains. He said, “These accounts
could supplement the income and product accounts, the flow of funds
accounts, and the balance of payments accounts.…A supplementary set
of detailed tables on capital gains exclusions from the national income
and product accounts also would be a useful addition to our overall sys-
tem of economic accounts.”
The dimensions of the information economy
In their opening paper, “The ‘New Economy’: Background, Histor-
ical Perspectives, Questions, and Speculation,” Bradford DeLong and
Lawrence Summers argued that the IT revolution will have significant
long-run effects on the economy and that the principal effects are more
likely to be “microeconomic” than “macroeconomic.” As a result, the
new information economy will require changes in the way the govern-
ment “provides property rights, institutional frameworks, and ‘rules of
the game’ that underpin the market economy.” 
DeLong and Summers gave two reasons for the large impact of IT.
First, the pace of technological progress in the IT sector is very rapid
and will continue to be very rapid for the foreseeable future. For exam-
ple, at the end of the 1950s, there were 2,000 computers processing
10,000 instructions per second. Today, 300 million computers are pro-
cessing several hundred million instructions per second. In addition,
instructions per second rose from 20 million to 90 quadrillion—a 4 bil-
lionfold increase in forty years. This translates into an annual growth
rate of 56 percent per year. As the IT sector of the economy becomes a
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larger share of the total economy, the overall rate of productivity growth
will increase toward the rate of productivity growth in the IT sector.
Second, the computers, switches, cables, and programs that are the
products of today’s leading sectors are general-purpose technologies. As
a result, advances in high-technology affect all aspects of the economy,
thereby leading to larger overall effects. While some argue that the
crash of the Nasdaq suggests that the information economy was a
mirage, DeLong and Summers disagree. They believe that the Nasdaq
crashed because:
It became clear to previously overoptimistic investors that the supply of bigger
fools ready to buy overvalued stocks had dried up, and that dominant market
positions in high-tech-based businesses were not sources of profits unless they
came accompanied by substantial barriers to entry—and that such barriers to
entry were turning out to be remarkably hard to create. Over a wide range, the
dominant effect of the ‘new economy’ has been to make competition more effec-
tive, not to create scale-related cost advantages.
DeLong and Summers also argued that the microeconomic effects—
how markets work—will have long-lasting and far-reaching effects on
the economy. As a result, the role of the government in the economy
needs to be re-examined. Since the creation of knowledge is cumulative,
the importance of intellectual property rights becomes more critical in
the new information economy. Three issues are interrelated: property
rights over ideas, incentives to fund research and development, and the
exchange of information among researchers. The authors also pointed
out that analysts have generally believed that price discrimination was a
way for monopolies to increase their profits. However, in the new infor-
mation economy, price discrimination may be essential for attaining eco-
nomic efficiency and maximizing social welfare.2
Finally, the authors argued that the new information economy is
“Schumpeterian” rather than “Smithian.” In a Schumpeterian economy,
the production of goods exhibits increasing returns to scale. Under these
conditions, the competitive equilibrium is not the likely outcome—set-
ting price equal to marginal cost does not allow the firm to recover the
large fixed costs. However, government regulation or government subsi-
dies to cover fixed costs destroy the entrepreneurial spirit and replace it
with “group-think and red-tape defects of administrative bureaucracy.” In
addition, when innovation becomes the principal source of wealth, tem-
porary monopoly power and profits may be essential to spur innovation.
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In discussing the DeLong and Summers paper, Alice Rivlin agreed
that the IT revolution will have a lasting impact on our economy, but
she was perhaps more skeptical than DeLong and Summers. Rivlin
pointed out that most of the economy does not produce IT goods; a
large part of the economy still produces and distributes food, clothing,
shelter, home furnishings, cars, haircuts, and medical care. 
Rivlin also reported on some of the insights provided from a recent
Brookings study on the economic impact of the Internet.3 A group of
scholars estimated that the increased use of the Internet could add 0.25
to 0.5 percent to productivity growth over the next five years. Most of
the impacts come from reducing the cost of data-intensive transactions
(ordering, invoicing, accounting, and recruiting), from improved man-
agement of supply chains, from increased competition, and from
increased efficiency of the wholesale and retail trade. In addition, many
of the benefits of IT may result in improved standards of living, even
though measured GDP is unaffected. Examples include reduced error
rates in medical care delivery; a reduction in accidents, crime, and fraud
prevention; and additional conveniences for consumers in the use of
time and space.
Market structure in the information economy
Following up on DeLong and Summers’ contention that most of the
impact of IT will be microeconomic rather than macroeconomic, Hal
Varian discussed many changes in the structure of the U.S. economy
that emanate from advances in high-tech. His article, “High-Technol-
ogy Industries and Market Structure,” discussed nine effects of IT on
the economy: the differentiation of products and prices, search,
bundling, switching cost and lock-in, supply-side economies of scale,
demand-side economies of scale, standards, system effects, and com-
puter mediated transactions. Of these nine effects, two—supply-side
and demand-side economies of scale—seem particularly important.
On the supply side, many information and technology firms have
cost structures characterized by constant fixed cost and zero (near-zero)
marginal costs. For example, a chip factory may cost billions of dollars
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to build (high fixed cost); the cost of producing an additional chip is
only a few dollars (near-zero marginal cost). Such industries are called
“natural monopolies.”
While natural monopolies often raise troubling policy issues, Varian
offered several caveats. First, competition is often much more dynamic
than generally thought. Since large scale provides a cost advantage,
firms will compete to be the largest, benefiting consumers. Varian cited
the example of Amazon.com, which built market share by offering con-
sumers low prices. Second, if the overall market is growing fast enough,
it is easier for firms to overcome the scale advantage of existing (large)
firms. Here, Varian cites the example of WordStar and WordPerfect
being eclipsed in the word-processing market and VisiCalc and Lotus in
the spreadsheet market. As Varian put it: “Market share alone is no
guarantee of success.” Third, IT has often reduced the minimum scale
of operation. For example, one person with a $1,000 PC can now pro-
duce a reasonably professional layout. Against these benefits, though, it
is still generally true that in such markets price will exceed marginal
cost, leading to conventional forms of inefficiency.
Another characteristic of many information goods is that they
exhibit “network externalities” or “demand-side economies of scale.” A
product exhibits network externalities if one person’s demand depends
on how many others use the product. The fax machine is the classic
example of a “direct network effect.” A DVD exhibits an “indirect net-
work effect” because the demand for DVDs depends on how many
DVD movies are available, which, in turn, depends on how many peo-
ple own DVDs. Such indirect network effects are common in informa-
tion goods when hardware depends on the availability of software and
the availability of software depends on hardware. This is the basis for
the argument that the cure for the current IT slump is a “new killer ap.”
When information goods exhibit both supply-side economies and
network effects, the interaction is particularly powerful. In such a case,
more sales lead to lower costs (supply-side economies of scale) and
greater demand by consumers (network effects). While not inevitable,
once a firm achieves significant market share, it will be difficult to over-
take the firm.
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In discussing the Varian paper, Erik Brynjolfsson focused his
remarks on the implications of the information economy for bundling
and for search. Brynjolfsson used the book retailing market to discuss
how IT can lead to greater concentration and greater competition. For
example, there are more than 30,000 physical bookstores and very few
booksellers on the Internet.4 With the greater concentration in online
booksellers, one might expect higher prices. In fact, prices are 10 to 12
percent lower. The paradox is resolved by observing that it is much eas-
ier to search and find competitors on the Internet. A book buyer may be
geographically near only one bookstore, but has access to all online
booksellers. Brynjolfsson put it this way: “Geography and ignorance
provide very powerful barriers and allow that bookstore to have higher
prices. On the Internet, competition is only a mouse click away. As a
consequence, that prevents even a relatively concentrated industry from
raising prices nearly as much.”
The size of the search cost savings can be significant. In a research
study involving students making Internet purchases, Brynjolfsson found
that the Internet was at least 30 times cheaper than using the telephone
and about 300 times cheaper than physically visiting the store. More-
over, evidence from General Motors suggests that a typical purchase
order costs $118 when handled through conventional channels but only
$8 when handled over the Internet. And, evidence from Fleet Bank
suggests that a business transaction inquiry handled over the telephone
costs $1.25, while over the Internet it costs 2 to 3 cents.
Kevin Murphy also commented on Varian’s paper. While recogniz-
ing that the effect of technology on consumer welfare is ambiguous,
Murphy was “much more optimistic.” He argued that competition can
take many different forms and that market concentration may not be a
useful measure of consumer welfare. For example, even though ex post
competition is light (when there are high fixed costs and zero marginal
costs), ex ante competition will be more vigorous. Moreover, competition
is much more complex than most economic models might suggest.
Firms may compete on the choice of standards or the choice of contracts. 
In addition, while information markets may be more concentrated,
market structure is not an end in itself. Rather, economists care about
market outcomes in terms of price, output, and technological improve-
ment—things that affect consumer welfare. Murphy elaborated on this
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theme by showing the ways in which “many of the forces that lead to
greater concentration do so precisely because they enhance competition
and/or make outcomes with greater concentration more efficient.” For
example, in the presence of network effects, concentrated markets
exploit the gains from a large network—leading to lower prices that
benefit consumers. Murphy emphasizes a trade-off in which the outcome
can be a single firm (maximizing the network benefits) or a few firms
(giving up some network benefits for greater ex-post competition).
Finally, in looking at actual technology markets, Murphy found:
“These markets are incredibly competitive. Even markets with high
concentration, such as the PC operating system market, are character-
ized by remarkably low prices and rapid rates of technical progress and
market growth.”
The financial market effects of the information economy
In their paper, “Technology, Information Production, and Market
Efficiency,” Gene D’Avolio, Efi Gildor, and Andrei Shleifer discussed the
effect of technology on securities markets. They argued that a well-
functioning securities market depends on four key factors: accurate
information, investors with access to the information, legal protection of
investors’ rights, and a liquid secondary market. They argued that
advances in technology have improved the functioning of the securities
market in the last three factors, but that the quality of information has
deteriorated.
The Internet has led to a significant increase in the quantity of
information available to investors. With greater information, the num-
ber of participants in financial markets has increased dramatically. For
example, the number of Americans participating in the equity market
has increased from 52 million in 1989 to 84 million in 1998. Technol-
ogy has also driven down trading costs. The authors cite a study that
one-way transaction costs (half-spread + NYSE commission) over the
last 20 years fell from 1.0 percent to 0.2 percent. Moreover, “decimal-
ization reduced effective spreads on the NYSE to roughly $0.06 for
high-volume stocks.”
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While increasing the quantity of information and reducing the cost
of trading, technology has also reduced the quality of information. The
effect of technology on the quality of information has two elements.
First, as technology drives down trading costs and more investors begin
trading, the marginal investor is “less experienced, less sophisticated, and
less able to derive fundamental security values from raw information.” As
an example, the authors presented evidence that Nasdaq stocks are more
likely to be held by individual, retail investors, than by institutional
investors. Thus, they concluded that it “appears to be predominantly
individuals…who are determining prices in the technology heavy Nas-
daq market, which has benefited most from unrealistic stock valuations.”
Second, the authors argued that changes in the economy “create
strong incentives for firms to distort the information they produce to
the investor community.” Since the authors do not believe that financial
intermediaries can privately solve the problem of information quality,
they advocated investor education programs and the regulation of infor-
mation disclosure.
In commenting on the paper by D’Avolio, Gildor, and Shleifer,
Roger Ferguson agreed with the policy implications advocated by the
authors. However, Ferguson disagreed with the authors’ conclusion that
information technology has “brought unsophisticated investors in
droves to the stock market.” He cited several pieces of evidence. If the
assertion were true, he said, one would expect to see direct holdings of
equities by households become a larger share of total equities outstand-
ing. In fact, survey evidence suggests that while the number of house-
holds owning equities has increased, the share held directly has
remained roughly constant during the last decade. In addition, the
characteristics of households that first bought individual stocks after
1995 is similar to the households that first bought individual stocks
between 1990 and 1995.
Ferguson also elaborated on the impact of technology on the retail
financial market. He pointed out that technology has increased the
number of providers of credit cards, mortgages, and small business
loans. In addition, technology has allowed loan originators to separate
risk from return and to sell the risk to the parties most willing to bear it
through securitization. Technology has also enhanced the ability of
lenders to evaluate and price credit risk. As Ferguson summarized, “In
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short, while the paper raises important concerns about equity markets,
other areas of finance provide evidence that the information age has
brought significant benefits in the form of increased transparency and
competition, lower costs, more appropriate pricing, and broader access
to credit.”
In his comments, Philipp Hildebrand raised the question of
whether the concern about the quality of information reflects the
impact of technology or “deeper structural or perhaps even cultural
forces at work that have amplified the consequences of the information
revolution.” In particular, some of the excesses might reflect a new cap-
italist spirit and American culture. As one bit of evidence, Hildebrand
argued that the impact of the information revolution in Europe was
very different than in the United States.
Hildebrand agreed with the authors’ conclusion about the need for
regulatory initiatives. However, he also urged caution: “As a practi-
tioner, I find myself rather in favor of the argument that financial mar-
kets are not always efficient. I do worry a great deal, however, that
misdirected regulatory attempts may render markets even more ineffi-
cient.…The role for government in the information economy is bound
to be a limited but an important one.”
Reducing the international digital divide
In the luncheon address, “Reducing the International Digital Divide,”
Donald Johnston argued that a digital divide can arise from a number of
sources. He used the automobile as an analogy: “So we need highways,
access to highways, vehicles, trained drivers, and instructors. And we also
need the rules of the road consistently applied.…The absence of any one
of these elements creates a digital divide.” Johnston pointed out that more
than 60 percent of people in Norway use the Internet, while less than 5
percent use the Internet in Indonesia and Ukraine. (In the United States,
between 55 and 60 percent use the Internet.)
Johnston felt that the recommendations of a 1969 United Nations
Commission on International Development remain valid today—
namely, “a major effort is needed to revitalize education and increase the
Hakkio.qxd  1/28/02  10:53 AM  Page 14ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2001 15
capacity to absorb, adapt, and develop scientific and technical know-
ledge in developing countries.” Information and communication tech-
nology (ICT) is an important tool in helping to achieve this objective.
Access is a key challenge. More than 95 percent of Internet hosts
and secure servers used for electronic commerce reside in OECD coun-
tries. While the public sector will play a role, Johnston believes that the
private sector will play a key role. Getting private sector involvement
will depend on “good governance.” Johnston stated that “applications
of the rule of law, market liberalization, fair competition laws, an appro-
priate regulatory framework, a well functioning financial sector, and so
on, are all part of that good governance infrastructure.” Johnston pro-
vided two examples. Following the opening of the telecommunications
market to competition, the number of fixed and wireless telephone lines
in Uganda quadrupled in two years (from 40,000 to nearly 160,000). In
Sri Lanka, the number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants went from
one to six in four years.
Johnston concluded with this recommendation: “As for developing
countries, educate people, build good clean governance, apply the rule
of law, liberalize telecommunications markets: Create that environment,
and private investment will come. The digital divide will start to close.”
II. MACROECONOMIC AND MONETARY POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF THE INFORMATION ECONOMY
The second day of the symposium focused on macroeconomics and
monetary policy. It started with a discussion of the broad macro impli-
cations of the information economy. It then turned to two important
monetary policy issues arising from the information economy. The day
concluded with an overview panel that addressed what the future might
hold.
Macroeconomic implications of the new economy
Martin Neil Baily, in his paper titled “Macroeconomic Implications
of the New Economy,” surveyed some of the macroeconomic implica-
tions of the information economy. Since 1995, real growth has
increased. From 1973 to 1990, real GDP growth averaged 2.9 percent;
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since 1995, it has averaged 4.1 percent. Productivity growth has shown
similar increases, averaging 1.9 percent from 1973 to 1990, and 3.2
percent since 1995. The conclusion is clear. “The strong growth of the
U.S. economy after 1995 is linked to a recovery of productivity
growth.” To be sure, though, the recovery lasted only five years.
The emergence of the information economy has been a key feature
of faster productivity growth. Information technology has affected pro-
ductivity in two ways. First, the IT sector itself has contributed directly
to stronger productivity. Computers and other IT hardware have
become better and cheaper, leading to increases in investment, employ-
ment, and output of the IT sector. Second, advances in technology have
also increased productivity in the more traditional sectors of the econ-
omy—financial services, business services, and the retail and distribu-
tion industries.
According to Baily, U.S. economic policy has also contributed to a
revival in productivity growth. “Policies to maintain domestic competi-
tion and increase international competition have been stressed. Funds
have been provided to support basic research and education. And, most
importantly, the mix of monetary and fiscal policy has lowered interest
rates and encouraged investment.” 
In commenting on Baily’s paper, Takatoshi Ito focused on the
implications of the new economy for Japan (a topic covered only briefly
by Baily). Ito observed that if the new economy is a permanent feature
of the global economy, it should be felt in Europe and Japan. It has not.
Interestingly, though, both Europe and Japan experienced the same IT
stock price bubble observed in the United States. For example, the
Nikkei rose from 13,000 in the fall of 1998 to 20,000 in February-
March, 2000, and then crashed to 11,000 at the end of August 2001
(the time of the symposium). Ito asked, “If so, why was the stock mar-
ket bubble internationally common while the real economy IT revolu-
tion was not?”
In explaining why Europe and Japan did not share in the U.S. pro-
ductivity revolution, Ito partly agreed with Baily but added a slightly
different slant. He argued that Japan (as well as Europe) has been less
successful in applying IT advances to other industries (rather than in
producing IT products). He added that organizational structure and
incentives are more important than regulatory barriers. He blamed
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labor practices and capital markets. In particular, Japanese society and
schools produce highly educated and well-trained workers, but not
innovative workers. Taking risk is not highly rewarded in Japanese com-
panies. Since the application of IT to other industries is risky, Japan has
been less successful.
In discussing Baily’s paper, John Taylor argued that “greater openness
and freedom of entry will lead to greater productivity growth in regions
where it has been lacking.” Baily reported evidence on the difference
between the price of a particular good in a country and the lowest price of
that same good in the world. This difference is a measure of competitive
forces. On average, prices in the United States are 15 percent higher than
the lowest prices in the world, while UK prices are 42 percent higher,
German prices are 60 percent higher, and Japanese prices are 85 percent
higher. The policy implication is that trade liberalization, which leads to
greater competition, can lead to faster productivity growth. 
Taylor suggested that IT might have led to less cyclical volatility by
improving monetary policy. The cyclical volatility of the U.S. economy
fell in the early to mid-1980s. In the past, Taylor has argued that an
improvement in overall macroeconomic policy, and monetary policy in
particular, contributed to this decline. Taylor said, “Although it is spec-
ulative, I believe improved…analysis (including seasonal adjustment),
better econometric models, and more timely analysis of data have all
helped improve macro policy formulation and implementation.”
Monetary policy in the information economy
While many analysts have suggested that the information economy
might reduce the ability of central banks to influence financial markets,
Michael Woodford argued this is not the case. In his paper, “Monetary
Policy in the Information Economy,” he argued that even in a world
with frictionless financial markets and a well-informed public, central
banks will be able to conduct monetary policy—perhaps even more effec-
tively—to guarantee price stability. However, the specific operating pro-
cedures will need to change.
The information economy can improve the effectiveness of mone-
tary policy by allowing the private sector to better anticipate future cen-
tral bank actions. Central banks typically operate by affecting overnight
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interest rates (such as the federal funds rate in the United States). By
affecting current overnight rates and, most important, by affecting mar-
ket expectations of future rates, monetary policy can affect financial
market prices such as long-term interest rates, exchange rates, and
equity prices. These prices, Woodford argued, have the greatest effect
on economic activity. 
Since the ability of a central bank to influence economic activity
depends critically on its ability to affect market expectations about the
future path of overnight interest rates, clarity about actions and inten-
tions can enhance the effectiveness of central banks. If a central bank’s
intentions are clear, Woodford suggested, the actual change in the
overnight interest rate can be more modest than otherwise (because
expected future short-term rates will change as well).
Woodford drew several lessons for the conduct of monetary policy.
First, monetary policy should be transparent and central banks should
explain their decisions to the public. Second, central banks should lead
the markets. Being transparent and not surprising financial markets do
not mean that central banks should always act to meet market expecta-
tions. If a central bank always delivers what markets expect, then there
is no objective anchor for financial market expectations. Changes in
expectations would become self-fulfilling because the central bank vali-
dates them. This, in turn, would be destabilizing. Third, policy should
be rule-based. If a central bank does not follow a rule, then the public
will never be able to understand and anticipate central bank actions. 
Woodford also addressed a controversy in monetary theory. Several
authors have argued that the information economy will reduce, or per-
haps eliminate, the demand for central bank money. If there were no
demand for central bank money, the central bank would be unable to
affect the overnight interest rate, thereby preventing the central bank
from influencing economic activity and maintaining price stability.
Woodford argued that this concern is misplaced.
Monetary policy affects economic activity and prices through its con-
trol of overnight interest rates. Overnight rates are determined in the
interbank market for central bank balances held by banks to meet reserve
requirements and to clear payments. Improvements in information tech-
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nology may reduce the demand for central bank balances to meet reserve
requirements. But, even if reserve requirements were eliminated, a
demand for central bank balances would remain for clearing purposes.
As long as there is a demand for clearing balances, Woodford
argued, central banks could control the overnight interest rate by con-
trolling the net supply of central bank balances. However, targeting the
quantity of central bank balances is unlikely to be effective because the
demand for clearing balances is small relative to the total volume of pay-
ments in the economy. Woodford pointed out that U.S. banks that par-
ticipate in the payments system send and receive payments each day that
are about 30 times the size of their average daily overnight clearing bal-
ances, and the ratio is closer to 200 for the most active banks. 
Woodford believes that while quantity targeting is not practical,
central banks can—and some already do—control the overnight inter-
est rate through using a “channel” system. The channel system keeps
the overnight rate between two rates, a lending rate and a deposit rate,
which are determined by the central bank’s introduction of two stand-
ing facilities. The central bank stands ready to lend any amount of
overnight balances at a fixed lending rate, which is set above the desired
overnight interest rate. The central bank also stands ready to let banks
deposit excess clearing balances overnight and earn a deposit rate, set
below the desired overnight interest rate. The lending rate is above, and
the deposit rate is below, the desired overnight interest rate so that
banks have an incentive to use the interbank market.
In a channel system, the demand for clearing balances is a function
of the desired overnight rate relative to the lending rate and deposit rate.
It is independent of the level of any of these interest rates. As a result,
changes in the desired overnight rate can occur without any change in
the supply of clearing balances.
In discussing Woodford’s paper, Robert Hall agreed “strongly with
everything” in Woodford conclusions. Hall first provided a different
perspective on a purported need for secrecy in monetary policy, stem-
ming from a misunderstanding of the work by Robert Lucas. Hall
pointed out that Lucas had argued that perceived changes in the money
supply were immediately reflected in changes in the price level. There-
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fore, “if a monetary policy works when it is easily capable of controlling
the price level, then the concern is backward—in the Lucas model, price
level control is improved by disclosure of monetary policy.”
Hall also agreed with Woodford’s point that a central bank can peg
a short-term interest rate, regardless of its portfolio size. Hall provided a
simple example. During the gold standard, changes in the interest rate
could be accomplished via changes in the gold content of the dollar. The
key point is that the central bank issues the security that defines the
dollar. By adjusting the quantity of, or interest paid on, the security, the
central bank can control the price level.
In commenting on Woodford’s paper, Mervyn King, elaborated on
the importance of transparency and communication. In particular, he
discussed what the central bank should communicate. In King’s view,
the central bank should communicate the timeless aspect of its deci-
sions, not the ad hoc justification for a particular decision. Of course, in
an ever-changing and complex economy, there is no timeless model for
the economy and, therefore, no timeless “policy reaction function.” In
such a world, what should central bankers communicate?
If the economy, and our understanding of the economy, is always
changing, King suggested, then a central bank should communicate
how it is learning about the economy and what lessons it has drawn
from recent experience. As the nature of the economy changes, mone-
tary policy committees become more important for making monetary
policy decisions than simple (or even complex) econometric models.
King argued that central bank communication must guide the public
along an intellectual journey, indicating what it does and does not
understand, rather than hinting at what it may or may not do at the
next meeting. 
Overview panel
The symposium concluded with overview comments and perspectives
on the future from Martin Feldstein, Christian Noyer, and Janet Yellen.
Feldstein believes that recent advances in information technology
will lead to continued strong productivity growth, and, therefore, over-
all economic growth. In addition, based on research by the National
Bureau of Economic Research, he believes that gains in productivity will
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come from reducing the number of nonproduction workers per unit of
output. Through visits to manufacturing firms, researchers from the
NBER noted that most employees in manufacturing firms are not
engaged in production, but rather in nonproduction activities, such as
sales, accounting, and purchasing. Advances in IT can eliminate many
of these middle management jobs and can help reorganize the produc-
tion process. Feldstein observed that “an increase in productivity growth
from the historic 1.5 percent a year to 2.5 percent represents an annual
reduction of only one employee in 100—i.e., doing the work with 99
employees that would have been done with 100 the year before. There
are many opportunities for such progress to continue in the future.”
Feldstein also addressed an issue raised in various papers and dis-
cussed throughout the symposium: namely, why has productivity
increased in the United States but not in Europe or Japan. Feldstein
believes there are three reasons for this. First, rigid labor and product
markets make it difficult for companies to reorganize production and
support staff activities. If a company cannot take advantage of new
technology by reorganizing production activities, then it will not adopt
new technology. Second, product markets are less competitive in Europe
and Japan than in the United States. Third, managers in Europe and
Japan have less personal incentives to adopt new information technolo-
gies than managers in the United States. For example, bonuses and
stock options are common ways to motivate managers in the United
States but not in Europe or Japan.
According to Feldstein, there is one potential downside to the Inter-
net revolution. He believes that the Internet has facilitated the anti-
globalization movement, hindering the new global trade round. 
In his overview remarks, Noyer focused on the implications of the
information economy for Europe and the European Central Bank.
While recognizing the impressive growth performance of the United
States during the last five years, Noyer noted that labor productivity
grew faster in Europe than in the United States during the previous two
decades. However, he did recognize that Europe is lagging in its ability
to exploit new technology in the IT-using sector. 
Noyer was also relatively optimistic about Europe’s economic
prospects. Recognizing the importance of competition for encouraging
the information economy, he said that the European single market for
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goods and services has increased competition in Europe. In addition, he
felt that the introduction of the euro has enhanced competition across
Europe because cross-country price comparisons are more transparent.
The European Central Bank has also helped create a stable macroeco-
nomic environment, which is important for investment and the adop-
tion of new technology. Monetary union has also facilitated financial
market deepening, providing greater financing alternatives for entrepre-
neurial firms. Finally, monetary union has increased competition among
governments to have the best possible and most flexible policies. 
In her comments, Yellen highlighted the policy lessons of the sym-
posium. First, economic policy matters to productivity growth. As she
said, “A regulatory environment and institutions that facilitate the real-
location of labor and capital are likely to improve both static efficiency
and also the dynamic gains from innovation.” Second, the information
economy may increase wage inequality by increasing the return to exer-
cising judgment, solving problems, and working in teams. Third,
stronger productivity growth makes an economy less susceptible to
inflation by reducing the NAIRU—at least for a time. 
Yellen also discussed how IT may affect the volatility of the macro-
economy. First, through facilitating the adoption of just-in-time inven-
tory techniques, new technology has influenced inventory behavior.
Second, IT could affect volatility through its impact on international
trade. Finally, IT could lead to increased systemic risk in financial mar-
kets and potentially destabilize financial markets.
Information technology might also affect the channels through
which monetary policy affects the economy. For example, she raised a
question first discussed by Euro-currency Standing Committee of the
G-10 in its 1994 Hannoun Report: Have the spending decisions of con-
sumers and firms become immune to interest rate and exchange rate
fluctuations due to the increased use of derivatives? If so, the transmis-
sion mechanism that operates through the credit availability channel
might be diminished. 
Finally, Yellen recognized the importance of technology for the
increase in global capital mobility. As Robert Mundell explained in the
1960s, perfect capital markets make it impossible for central banks to
simultaneously conduct independent monetary policy and peg the
exchange rate. They need to choose one or the other. Yellen concluded by
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predicting that “in the decades ahead, a growing number of central banks
will decide to close shop, abandon an independent currency, and dollarize
or join a currency area rather than live with the often destabilizing eco-
nomic consequences of flexible exchange rates. This development, if it
happens, can be viewed as a logical consequence of the IT revolution.”
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ENDNOTES
1 Of course, in the last few years, the stock market gains have been larger in
magnitude. As a result, the dollar magnitude would be larger for stock market
gains than housing price gains.
2 DeLong and Summers cited the pharmaceutical industry as a good example.
They asked, “Does anyone doubt that good public policy today should focus on
providing drug companies with powerful incentives and tools for them to charge
radically different prices to consumers in rich and in poor countries?”
3 “The Economic Payoff from the Internet Revolution,” Robert E. Litan and
Alice M. Rivlin, eds., Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2001.
4 According to Brynjolfsson, there are a few thousand online retailers, but
three of them control about 85 percent of the market.
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